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DELEGATING TO INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS: SELF-BINDING VS. OTHER-
BINDING DELEGATION 
KAREN J. ALTER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
One often hears complaints that international courts are undermining 
national sovereignty. Critics tend to associate a compromise of sovereignty with 
the claim that courts are exceeding their mandate or running amok. This article 
explores the linkage between these two notions—sovereignty being 
compromised, and courts exceeding their mandate—by exploring the distinction 
between “self-binding” and “other-binding” delegation to courts. 
A central claim of this article is that using a single lens to view delegation to 
courts distorts our understandings of the political role of judges. Courts play 
four distinct roles within political systems: dispute adjudication, administrative 
review, criminal enforcement, and constitutional review. In some of these roles, 
legislative actors delegate decisionmaking authority to courts as an “other-
binding” means of social control; through delegation, states primarily bind 
others actors (citizens, businesses, government employees, administrative 
agencies, police, et cetera) to follow the interpretation and application of legal 
rules by courts. In other roles, legislative bodies or states bind themselves 
(“self-binding”), subjecting their decisionmaking authority to judicial oversight 
so as to enhance their own credibility as a “rule of law” political system. Self-
binding delegations are by their very nature sovereignty-compromising. Other-
binding delegations to courts are more frequent and less likely to be 
sovereignty-compromising. The situation of courts’ exceeding their mandate, 
and thus compromising sovereignty, applies, but rarely: when a court transforms 
a given role, turning an other-binding authority into a self-binding role. 
Part II defines more fully the difference between self- and other-binding 
delegation to courts, and maps these differences onto the four different roles 
courts play in a political system. The discussion starts with delegation in the 
domestic context because international delegation borrows from the domestic 
model. The discussion identifies when and how delegating the same role to a 
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court will affect national sovereignty differently at the domestic and 
international levels. Part II also discusses how states try to limit the authority of 
courts in each role. 
Part III examines the empirical record on delegating specific roles to specific 
international courts (ICs), using as data delegation to all existing ICs, twenty in 
total.1  The analysis helps explain an empirical puzzle in the trend of delegating 
authority to ICs. Since 1990, there has been a proliferation in the number of 
ICs2 and in IC usage so that seventy-five percent of the total IC output of 
decisions, opinions, and rulings (24,863 out of 33,057) have come since 1990. 
These “new” ICs are not only recent creations; they are qualitatively different 
entities.3  Newer ICs are more likely to have compulsory jurisdiction and either 
private access or access for international nonstate actors to initiate litigation, 
even though most observers agree that these features make ICs more 
independent and more likely to rule on cases in which a government is an 
unwilling participant.4 
State concerns about national sovereignty have not lessened since 1990. 
What is this change to “new” ICs about? I argue that the trend towards creating 
and using ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and nonstate actor access follows 
from the decision to use ICs in roles other than interstate dispute resolution—
namely for administrative review, enforcement, and, less frequently, 
constitutional review. Most of these additional roles involve other-binding  
 
 1. This article adopts the definition of an IC created by the Project on International Courts and 
Tribunals (PICT): ICs are (1) permanent institutions, (2) composed of independent judges (3) that 
adjudicate disputes between two or more entities, one of which is a state or international organization. 
They (4) work on the basis of predetermined rules of procedure and (5) render decisions that are 
binding. For a discussion of this definition, see PICT’s synoptic chart. The Project on Int’l Courts and 
Tribunals, Research Matrix (2000), http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/matrixhome.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2008). This discussion does not include certain African courts that exist on paper but do not yet exist in 
practice. See discussion infra note 35. Thus, if anything, this article underreports the trend of delegation 
to international legal bodies. 
 2. See Cesare Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the 
Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999).  See also Jose Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: 
(Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 405 (2003); Benedict Kingsbury, Is the Proliferation 
of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679, 680 
(1999); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005); Chester Brown, The Proliferation of 
International Courts and Tribunals: Finding Your Way Through the Maze, 3 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 
453, 454–57 (2002) (reviewing MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Philippe 
Sands, Ruth Mackenzie & Yuval Shany eds., 1999)). 
 3. Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22, 
25–27 (2006). 
 4. Compulsory jurisdiction and private access limit the ability of states to block a case from 
proceeding to court. These features are emphasized in Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley’s introduction 
to this volume as shaping the extent to which delegation to ICs is sovereignty-compromising. These are 
the critical features of ICs discussed in the debate over IC independence between Eric Posner, John 
Yoo, Laurence Helfer, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. See Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why 
States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV 899 
(2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (2005). 
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delegation wherein ICs are empowered to review the actions of international 
actors or the decisions of national administrators tasked with implementing 
international rules. And it appears that, numerically speaking, most of the 
increase in IC activity involves ICs playing “other-binding” roles.5  This analysis 
explains why ICs increasingly have design features that make them highly 
independent, yet why relatively few international legal rulings are controversial. 
It also helps to situate the more sovereignty-compromising examples of 
delegation to ICs within the larger universe of delegation to ICs. 
Part IV concludes by addressing the implications of this analysis for debates 
about IC independence as it relates to sovereignty costs in delegating to ICs, 
including debates regarding principal–agent theories and about whether 
“dependent” international courts are more effective than independent ICs. The 
article urges a focus on judicial roles, rather than on the design of the court, to 
understand the extent to which sovereignty becomes compromised. It also 
suggests that expectations attached to judicial roles, rather than concerns about 
judges being sanctioned, shape how judges think about deference to political 
bodies and how audiences react to judicial rulings that upset powerful actors. 
II 
THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION TO COURTS—DISPUTE ADJUDICATION, 
ADMINISTRATIVE, ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES 
As Curtis Bradley and Judith Kelley note in their opening article, delegation 
of authority inherently involves sovereignty costs.6 The heart of the issue is the 
magnitude of sovereignty costs. What is being delegated to courts is the power 
to interpret the legal rules. The sovereignty risk in ceding interpretive authority 
to courts is that judicial rulings can shift the meaning of law in ways that can be 
politically irreversible.7 This risk is not just hypothetical. Constitutional review 
involves nullifying laws passed by legislative bodies, while administrative review 
involves rejecting decisions made by public actors. Thus, if judicial actors play 
their intended roles, judges will at times disagree with, rule against, or render 
interpretations that run counter to what the makers and the enforcers of the law 
might have wanted, and what the democratic majority might prefer. 
Although delegation to courts always risks that the judge will interpret the 
law in unanticipated and unwanted ways, the risk to national sovereignty 
 
 5. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 6. Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008). 
 7. As many have shown, the voting thresholds required to reverse legal interpretation are 
particularly challenging to surmount because reversing legal rulings means disempowering actors who 
prefer the legally created status quo, and if reversal is perceived as political interference in a legal 
domain, defenders of the rule of law will rally to the side of judges. See Karen J. Alter, Who Are the 
Masters of the Treaty?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 
136–40 (1998); Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy Making: Grove 
City College v. Bell (1984) (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wash. Univ., St. Louis) (on file with 
author).  
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associated with delegation to courts varies—not primarily in terms of the design 
of the court, but rather by the role the court is asked to play. Self-binding 
delegation to courts involve high sovereignty costs because the defendant in the 
case will almost always be a state actor, and the legal review will involve asking 
whether legislative actors violated the law or exceeded their authority. Other-
binding delegations to courts involve lower sovereignty costs because the 
defendants will primarily be private actors, or the court will mainly be 
monitoring to see that public actors faithfully adhere to the legislative will. 
Delegation to courts brings benefits as well. Litigants can hope that a judge 
ruling in their favor will make it more likely that the loser in the case will 
change their behavior. Governments and legislatures can hope that judicial 
rulings in their favor increase their credibility, imparting a “rule of law” 
imprimatur on public actions. After defining these concepts more fully, this Part 
identifies the logic of delegation in four judicial roles one finds in domestic legal 
systems, and how international delegation to courts differs from delegating the 
same role domestically. 
A. Self-Binding and Other-Binding Delegation 
In all cases of delegation to courts, judges are delegated the decisionmaking 
authority to interpret and apply the law to the case at hand. The sovereignty 
risk associated with this delegation is primarily shaped by the judicial role 
(dispute adjudication, enforcement, administrative, or constitutional review) 
because the role defines which actor is likely to be the defendant in the case, the 
nature of the decision or rule that is subject to review, and whether judges are 
more likely to defer to legislative will in their interpretations. A stylized 
historical narrative helps explain this difference. 
In earlier times and in smaller societies, there was no delegation to judges; 
chiefs and kings both made law and served as the interpreters of the law. As 
territories grew, delegation of interpretive authority became unavoidable. 
Sovereign actors—those with the authority to make law—primarily delegated 
adjudicative authority, the power to make a decision about a controversy or a 
dispute. Although sovereign actors were ceding interpretation of the law, they 
were not themselves subject to the interpretations of their “judges,” mainly 
because no judge would presume to know better than the sovereign what the 
law meant. This delegation was “other-binding”—sovereigns were subjecting 
others to judicial interpretations of the law. As the state apparatus grew, the 
role of judges grew. Cases still appeared as controversies judges were asked to 
resolve, but when the subject of cases became state actors, judges ended up in a 
monitoring-and-enforcing role, reviewing whether the king’s other agents (for 
example tax collectors, local rulers, state administrators, et cetera) were 
faithfully following the sovereign’s laws. Neither type of delegation—
adjudicative, or monitoring and enforcing—bound the sovereign so long as the 
king himself was never subjected to the authority of the court. 
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With the advent of constitutional democracy came self-binding delegation, 
wherein branches of government agreed to limit their powers by binding 
themselves to the authority of others—including to the authority of courts.8 
Also, the introduction of increasingly complex delegation chains complicates 
the story. As states have sought to control more elements of the economy and 
society, governments have created many types of public actors, including 
administrative agencies, entire criminal-justice systems, and executive agencies 
that sometimes have what amounts to delegated legislative authority. States 
have increasingly subjected the actions of these actors to judicial oversight. Do 
we call such oversight self-binding, or other-binding? The distinction can be 
subtle, and the difference can be intentionally or unintentionally blurred as the 
political roles of judges and of public actors shift. This article considers other-
binding contemporary delegation wherein judges oversee implementation of 
legal rules by public actors, so long as a state’s legislative outputs or authority is 
not being subjected to judicial review. 
This article operationalizes the distinction between self- and other-binding 
delegations by examining four roles courts play in political systems. The 
dispute-adjudication role is analogous to the king’s representative resolving 
disputes. It pertains when there is a disagreement in a contractual relationship, 
and the disagreement is brought to a judge to resolve. The defendant in the case 
is a signatory to the contract, and either the contract itself or the relation of the 
contract to a larger framework of rules is under review. The other roles are 
contemporary outgrowths of constitutional democracy. In the enforcement role, 
a judge monitors police and prosecutors as they use the state’s coercive power. 
In administrative review, a judge checks the legal validity of the decisions, 
actions, and non-actions of public administrative actors, who themselves rely on 
delegated authority. Constitutional review checks whether the law created by 
legislatures or interpreted and applied by governments, or both, coheres with 
the constitution. 
By its very nature, constitutional-review authority has the highest 
sovereignty risk because by definition it involves judges reviewing the legality of 
laws and, by definition, judges are supposed to prioritize the constitution over 
the will of the legislature. The other types of delegation vary in the sovereignty 
risks involved, depending on whether a public actor is likely to be a plaintiff or 
a defendant, the scope of judicial review, and whether the court’s jurisdiction is 
compulsory. These factors can vary for domestic and international delegation of 
the same judicial role, even when the international court’s design mimics its 
domestic counterpart identically. 
This Part identifies jurisdictional elements of courts, identifying how to 
recognize if a specific judicial role has been delegated to an IC. At the domestic 
 
 8. Of course this binding is somewhat fictitious, since the self-binding could be undone through a 
new constitutional act. The metaphor Jon Elster uses is that of Ulysses, who ties himself to the mast to 
avoid the temptation of the Sirens. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000). 
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level, the legislative origin of a judicial role may be hard to trace, and there may 
indeed be no explicit legislative grant delegating authority. At the international 
level, however, judicial roles are defined in the founding treaties of ICs. This 
Part identifies key jurisdictional features associated with specific judicial roles: 
whether a role requires compulsory jurisdiction or private access for nonstate 
actors to initiate litigation; whether the role is other-binding, self-binding, or 
both; and how these categories differ internationally compared to domestically. 
Note that this discussion describes each judicial role as a Weberian ideal type, 
focusing on the function for the state that the court is serving in each role. Ideal 
types are useful in identifying essential characteristics and drawing distinctions, 
but by definition ideal types simplify and do not comport with reality.9 With 
respect to the analysis here, the ideal types both underemphasize and 
overemphasize variations one might find within a category.10 The ideal type 
approach is nonetheless useful because it allows comparison across roles, 
revealing how the logic inherent in the delegation act varies by judicial role. 
In practice, judicial roles may change, in some cases morphing a court 
considerably from its original design. The role designations inherent in the 
original act of delegation likely shape the design of the legal body and, at least 
originally, the nature of the cases raised. When litigants ask judges questions 
that push them outside of their original roles, when judges embrace these 
opportunities to expand legal doctrine, and when such doctrinal shifts are 
accepted by legal and political communities, the court’s role will morph. As 
judicial roles evolve, the roles become hats judges put on as they decide legal 
issues. When thrust into a role, the judge dons the role, and with it the logic 
associated with the role, as he would a hat. As judges change roles, they change 
hats. In this context, the ideal type role would provide a first-cut “logic of 
appropriateness” that would set expectations as to what the judge should do in 
the case.11 Even if the judge were disappointing powerful actors or 
compromising sovereignty, so long as judges stay close to the expected role-
 
 9. The concept of an “ideal type” was introduced by Max Weber. “Ideal types” are intellectual 
constructs representing definitions that are logically controlled and conceptually pure. By definition, 
ideal types are not meant to represent reality. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 59–60 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., 1946). 
 10. The categories underemphasize variation because within a single role (for example, 
administrative review, constitutional review, et cetera), different national designs and differences in the 
powers given to courts will be important in shaping how a court plays its role. For example, the political 
role of constitutional courts will vary based on whether constitutional courts have abstract judicial-
review authority, concrete judicial-review power, or both. In addition, variation in how judges and legal 
cultures employ notions like standing, burden of proof, the standard of review, et cetera, will lead to 
meaningful cross-national variation despite the similarity in role across systems. The categories 
overemphasize variation across roles because, in practice, cases can involve multiple issues, leading a 
court to assume multiple roles within a single case. For an example of these differences, see ALEC 
STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000). 
 11. On the logic of appropriateness, see James March & Johan Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics 
of International Political Orders, in EXPLORATION AND CONTESTATION IN THE STUDY OF WORLD 
POLITICS 303, 311–12 (Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner eds., 1999). 
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based logic, the ruling is less likely to be controversial, and it will be harder to 
pin on the court the charge that it was “exceeding its authority.” 
B. Delegation of Dispute-Adjudication Authority to Courts 
Dispute adjudication in its ideal typical form is private-law adjudication. 
Two private parties subject to the law bring a dispute to a judge, who renders an 
interpretation that binds both parties. These disputes are usually conceptualized 
as arising from contractual disagreements—differences in opinions regarding 
duties and obligations owed—though the “contracts” are often informal and 
implicit. Shapiro identifies this judicial role as participating in social control.12 In 
delegating to judges the authority to interpret the law, state actors are seizing 
the parties’ desires to have a judicial resolution of a dispute as an opportunity to 
bring state laws into the private realm—into neighborly disputes, business 
interactions, and even family decisions. In choosing the legal outcome, judges 
are choosing the state’s desired resolution—that custody of a child goes first to 
blood relatives, that firms be accountable for their actions, et cetera. 
Dispute adjudication can involve a mix of public and private actors, yet still 
involve an other-binding, social-control logic. States want their interlocutors to 
follow general contractual rules so that private actors will be willing to enter 
into trustful relationships like signing contracts, letting school buses bring their 
children to school, and so forth. When public contractors are held accountable 
in the same terms as private contractors, the social-control logic is still at play—
states are binding their interlocutors to follow a set of common rules.13 
How does one know if an IC has dispute-adjudication authority? Although 
it is easy to identify administrative review or enforcement authority, dispute 
adjudication is a catchall category. Every “concrete” legal case has two parties 
who disagree (otherwise the parties would have settled out of court), leading to 
a judge interpreting and applying the law to render a ruling. Given its 
ubiquitous nature, judicial dispute-adjudication authority has to be identified in 
terms of what it is not. International courts with dispute-adjudication authority 
have a formal jurisdiction to “interpret the meaning of the law” in concrete 
cases brought before them. A judge stays entirely in a dispute-adjudication role 
when there is no question about the legal validity of the law itself, or about the 
validity of a public actor’s action executing the law. Dispute adjudication is also 
not enforcement when a public prosecutor is charging the defendant with 
violations of the law. 
 
 12. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17–20 (1981). 
 13. This desire to hold state actors accountable in similar contractual terms as private actors is so 
compelling that over time foreign sovereign immunity, a fundamental diplomatic courtesy, has been 
compromised. Policies like that expressed in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), have been passed to 
revoke sovereign immunity with respect to commercial interactions. This Act has reverberated through 
the international system, creating new doctrines that limit sovereign immunity. See MALCOLM N. 
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 628–38 (2003). 
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Within this definition, domestic delegation of dispute-adjudication authority 
is primarily other-binding delegation, and thus minimally sovereignty-
compromising. Dispute adjudication does not require that a court’s jurisdiction 
be compulsory. But since states are binding others—firms, citizens, et cetera—
they usually have no qualms about making the judge’s jurisdiction for this role 
compulsory. Because delegation of dispute-adjudication authority is other-
binding, the interests of both the state and the judge are aligned. When there 
are questions about the meaning of the law, the judge should be deferential to 
the legislative body that wrote the law. Since both the judge and the state want 
the parties to follow the law as it becomes legally defined, it is no surprise that 
states lend their coercive mechanisms to the task of enforcing judicial decisions. 
At the international level, however, delegation of the same type of authority 
can be self-binding because a state’s public policies might themselves become 
the subject of international judicial interpretation. Given that state policy might 
be subject to review, governments have historically been ambivalent about 
granting ICs compulsory jurisdiction in this role so as to be able to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether they will submit to legalized dispute adjudication.14 
This ambivalence has been overcome it seems: increasingly, dispute-
adjudication authority is coupled with compulsory jurisdiction that turns an IC’s 
dispute-adjudication role into a sort of decentralized enforcement role.15 With 
compulsory jurisdiction, states may get a more usable international dispute-
adjudication system, one that is less easily blocked. But now the IC can be 
ruling on cases where a state is an unwilling party, and thus unsurprisingly, 
compliance with such rulings is more problematic. Compulsory dispute 
adjudication thus differs fundamentally at the international level compared to 
the domestic level primarily in that the interests of the state and of the IC are 
not aligned—the losing state may not want to participate in legal proceedings 
let alone comply, and since compliance is not per se in the interest of the non-
complying state (or other states in the system for that matter) there may not be 
any coercive support to enforce a ruling.16 
C. Delegation of Enforcement Authority to Courts 
Although it is commonly said that courts “enforce the law,” it is always 
states, with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, that enforce the law by 
punishing those who violate the law. States can enforce the rules on their own, 
 
 14. WERNER LEVI, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 70–71 (1976). 
 15. The World Trade Organization (WTO) system, for example, explicitly blurs the line into an 
enforcement role. The case starts as dispute resolution—both state parties pick panelists they prefer in 
the hopes of finding a middle-ground resolution. But the case can end as enforcement, with the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body determining the extent of the damage caused by the violating country’s 
behavior and authorizing the victim state to do what would be otherwise illegal—to construct a 
purposely discriminatory and trade-diminishing barrier. For more on the WTO dispute-resolution 
system, see JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME 67–74 (2006). 
 16. Although compliance is more problematic, it is not necessarily true that ICs are therefore less 
effective. Compliance is a poor indicator of effectiveness. See Kal Raustiala, Compliance and 
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387 (2000). 
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using their extensive coercive power to punish those who violate their rules. In 
a rule-of-law system, however, the task of overseeing the legitimate use of 
coercive power is delegated to judges. In this “enforcement” role, the judge 
essentially monitors the state’s use of its coercive power and thereby helps 
convince the public that the state is not abusing its power. 
For the enforcement role, a court is given jurisdiction over a body of law, 
and a public prosecutor or enforcement body that charges a defendant with 
violating the law brings cases before the judge. If the prosecutor manages to 
convince the judge that the defendant violated the law, the judge can authorize 
a public actor to do what would otherwise be illegal and illegitimate—to deny a 
person his or her liberty, to seize his or her property, or to violate the law in 
retaliation. Since guilty parties are unlikely to submit themselves voluntarily to 
judicial proceedings about their behavior, enforcement roles require that courts 
have compulsory jurisdiction. 
At the domestic level, the judicial-enforcement role is largely other-binding 
in the sense that defendants are likely to be private actors and judges are mainly 
being asked to hold police accountable to following the rules legislative actors 
set. But, delegating this role to judges is also self-binding to the extent that 
states are subjecting their use of police powers to judicial oversight. States 
minimize the sovereignty implication of this self-binding dimension by 
controlling the prosecutor. Criminal courts rule on cases only at the 
prosecutor’s request; victims are not allowed to trigger legal proceedings. By 
making the prosecutorial office a political office, governments have a big say 
over which cases are brought to court for review. 
At the international level, there are two very different types of judicial-
enforcement roles. Criminal enforcement mimics its domestic counterpart—
there is a public prosecutor, the court has jurisdiction over an enumerated list of 
crimes, and convicted criminals face prison terms. Clear examples in which 
international criminal enforcement is delegated in an other-binding way include 
victors’ justice war-crimes trials, and ad hoc international tribunals set up by the 
UN Security Council (UNSC). These delegations are “other-binding” because 
the states delegating authority to judges knew they would not themselves be 
subject to the ad hoc criminal court’s jurisdiction. The International Criminal 
Court (ICC) stands in sharp contrast, representing potentially self-binding 
delegation since its jurisdictional reach is not limited geographically or (post-
2001) temporally. At the domestic level, the way to limit the sovereignty costs 
of delegation is by political bodies influencing or controlling the prosecutor. 
Appointment of international commissions or prosecutors can be influenced by 
powerful states, and the UNSC can put a six-month stay on a prosecutorial 
investigation. Moreover, the international prosecutor will need resources 
(financial and informational) to investigate crimes and compile cases. By 
withholding resources, rich states can greatly undermine the functioning of the 
ICC system. 
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A second international-enforcement role concerns law violations without 
violence, wherein the stigmatizing term “criminal” is intentionally not used. In 
the international context, one finds “infringement” mechanisms whereby an 
international commission triggers a legal proceeding and the judge determines 
if a state’s behavior is incompatible with the requirements of the treaty. 
Both forms of delegated enforcement authority can be harder for a single 
state to control at the international level, compared to the domestic level. 
International prosecutorial bodies see it as their job to pursue legal violations. 
Collectively, states are usually able to block prosecutions from proceeding.17 But 
a single state may be unable to block a prosecutor or commission from 
proceeding. Given the risk, international safeguards have been added to 
international delegations of enforcement authority. For criminal enforcement, 
an international prosecutor may not proceed with a case if a domestic court has 
already given serious consideration to the crime. Thus, a state can escape ICC 
authority by prosecuting the crime in the domestic legal system. States manage 
international infringement authority by limiting the nature of the sanctions 
associated with legal violations. Sometimes international bodies can levy a fine 
or authorize financial retaliation against a state maintaining an illegal policy, 
and other times the legal ruling itself is meant to evoke social opprobrium by 
identifying an action as “illegal.” In both situations, review of infringements is 
prospective—illegal behavior only becomes seriously costly should a state 
persist in violating the law. 
These political safeguards do not apply to the morphed role of decentralized 
judicial enforcement. When international dispute resolution is coupled with 
compulsory jurisdiction, dispute adjudication easily morphs into an 
enforcement role that may actually be more sovereignty-compromising than 
explicit delegations of enforcement authority. Prosecutors can be politically 
dissuaded from raising a case, and their burden of proof is higher; they must 
show beyond a reasonable doubt that a legal violation occurred. It can be 
harder to dissuade a plaintiff-state from bringing a case than it is to dissuade an 
international prosecutor, and the plaintiff-state need convince the judge only 
that its interpretation of the law is correct, making the case perhaps harder to 
stymie. Thus compulsory dispute adjudication may, along with delegation to the 
ICC, represent the most sovereignty-compromising examples of ICs with 
explicit and de facto enforcement roles. 
D. Delegation of Administrative Review Authority to Courts 
Administrative review is the main judicial means to hold the actors 
implementing legislative policies accountable. This delegation is other-binding 
in that the actors who write the law (legislatures) are using judges to monitor 
 
 17. For infringement proceedings, commissions are highly susceptible to political pressure. The 
UNSC can block the ICC’s prosecutor from raising a case, but even without this formal block, it is 
unlikely that a prosecutor will pursue a case when there is significant transnational political opposition 
to doing so. 
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the actors that implement the law (administrators, or “the government”). The 
administrative-review logic tells judges to be deferential to the legislative body 
and to defer to the will of the legislative body over that of the public 
administrator as they interpret and apply the law. 18 
One can recognize a court with administrative-review authority from its 
jurisdiction. Courts with the authority to hear cases regarding the legality of a 
government action, policy, or regulation, or to hear “actions to annul” or 
“failure to act” charges regarding decisions or nondecisions of public 
implementers of the law, have administrative-review powers. Administrative-
review courts have compulsory jurisdiction and private access so the actors 
affected by government decisionmaking can challenge arbitrary decisions. 
Administrative-court rulings generally do not substitute a specific judicial 
decision for the contested administrative decision; rather, they remand the case 
back to the administration so that it can try again to make a decision that will 
not be rejected by the court. Thus administrative review tends to be a fire-alarm 
system of oversight, akin to Bradley and Kelley’s category of delegation-of-
oversight authority.19 
Administrative review differs from constitutional review in that judges are 
not ruling on the validity of the law itself, but rather on whether a particular 
government decision or policy is congruent with the law, or whether the policy 
has been implemented in accordance with the law, or both. Admittedly a fine 
line separates constitutional and administrative review, and in political systems 
in which all courts feel free to practice constitutional review, the lines can 
become quite blurred. But the difference between administrative and 
constitutional review has also been made distinct in both domestic and 
international contexts. 20 
There can be great variation in the extent of administrative check created 
through administrative review. Some administrative-review systems have a 
narrow standard of review where courts check only that proper procedure was 
followed or that the decision was not “arbitrary and capricious” in its 
application to the litigant, or both. This narrow standard of review tells courts 
to grant administrators significant deference in how they interpret and apply 
rules. Some standards of review are broad, with judges checking the facts and 
 
 18. This conceptualization of administrative review is consistent with the argument made by Barry 
Weingast and Mark Moran, and by Christopher Edley who gives as a subtitle to his book “rethinking 
judicial control of bureaucracy.” See CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic 
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. 
POL. ECON. 765 (1983). 
 19. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 22. Kal Rausiala makes a similar argument. See Kal 
Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 3 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (2004). 
 20. In the United States, Italy, and to some extent Germany, all courts feel empowered to reject 
laws that judges deem unconstitutional. In these systems, supreme constitutional courts serve primarily 
as appellate bodies. But many national systems maintain a strong distinction between administrative 
and constitutional review. These systems, as in France, only allow constitutional courts to conduct 
constitutional review. 
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the interpretations of rules to see if the administrator made the correct 
decision.21 The broader the standard of review, and the harder it is to change 
laws underpinning administrative rules, the greater the sovereignty costs 
associated with administrative-review authority. 
International administrative review is in large part the “other-binding” tool 
of divided government that one finds in the domestic realm. When ICs are 
reviewing only the decisions of international institutions—like the Seabed 
Authority, the Andean General Secretariat, the General Secretary of the 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), or the 
European Commission (EC)—international delegation of administrative-review 
authority is not sovereignty-compromising even when coupled with private 
access so that the subjects of IO (international organization) administrative 
decisionmaking can challenge IO decisions. But international administrative 
review can also be sovereignty-compromising. The main implementers of 
international regulatory law are states, not international organizations. 
Examples of ICs’ explicitly granted review authority over domestic 
administrations include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
Chapter 19 panels (which are not permanent international courts). These are, 
by design, intended to review whether American, Canadian, and Mexican 
administrations and administrative courts have made correct decisions in 
subsidy and anti-dumping cases. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) were also, from inception, designed to review 
decisions of supranational administrative actors and whether national 
administrators were implementing common policies correctly.22 Delegation in 
these contexts was meant to both help implement complex international rules, 
and reassure other states that countries would not practice favoritism or 
undermine the meaning of their commitments during implementation. Explicit 
grants of international administrative-review authority tend to be coupled with 
private access, even though wider access rules can make delegation more 
sovereignty-compromising because they limit state latitude in interpreting legal 
rules. 
E. Delegation of Constitutional-Review Authority 
Although the rule of law requires that governments (like private actors) be 
held accountable to law, it does not require checks on law-making power. 
Indeed, philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau 
 
 21. Christopher Edley discusses how standards of review can vary. See Edley, supra note 18, at 96–
129. 
 22. Indeed the ECJ’s innovative preliminary-review mechanism was created for this purpose—to 
allow challenges to the implementation of European rules that were raised in domestic courts to be 
channeled to the ECJ for review. See Pierre Pescatore, Les travaux du “Groupe Juridique” dans la 
négociation des Traités de Rome, 34 STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 172 (1981). 
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considered any check on sovereign power to be inherently problematic.23 
Political systems embodying this view include the United Kingdom, which has 
no constitution and no constitutional court, though it is certainly a “rule of law” 
country. Other philosophers (like John Locke)24 believed that sovereign power 
ends up being exercised better when it is subject to checks and balances. Those 
who believe in checks and balances create constitutional political systems with 
constitutional-review mechanisms. Constitutional-review authority entails the 
power to nullify laws and policies that contradict the constitution. Committing 
to constitutional review is both a self-binding precommitment on the part of the 
legislature, and an other-binding choice made to bind future legislative actors 
and units within the political system to the constitutional bargain.25 
Like administrative-review- and criminal-enforcement authority, 
constitutional-review authority can work only when the court’s jurisdiction is 
compulsory. Unlike administrative review, constitutional review does not 
require private access. Indeed, in France, constitutional review exists without 
any right of private actors to instigate review. Delegation of constitutional-
review authority is always sovereignty-compromising and by design, it shifts 
power away from those with majority control of the political apparatus so as to 
provide a check against majority rule.26 
We can recognize an intentional delegation of constitutional-review 
authority to international courts through the grant of jurisdiction to nullify laws. 
As in the national realm, the delegation reveals an intent to limit what the 
international institutions can do in the future. The European Union (EU), the 
Andean Community, and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
have political bodies that are, in essence, legislative bodies capable of creating 
rules, policies, and even laws that are directly binding on member states. The 
international courts in these political systems (the ECJ, the ATJ, and the 
COMESA court) were explicitly empowered to hear challenges to the collective 
decisions raised by member states or private actors. In these cases, raised either 
directly or for some ICs referred from a national court, the IC determines 
whether acts taken by these legislative actors are ultra vires (exceeding the 
authority of the bodies).27 If a law were ultra vires, it would be nullified. In this 
example, states are self-binding against their own potential desire to use an 
international body expansively. Since European laws can be created based on 
 
 23. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN; OR, THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A COMMON 
WEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL (1962); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU & HENRY JOHN TOZER, 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (Henry John Tozer, trans., 1905). 
 24. See John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION (1956). 
 25. ELSTER, supra note 8, at 115–18.  
 26. For more on the variety of constitutional delegations, see SWEET, supra note 10, at 47. 
 27. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C310) 1; Treaty 
Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement ch. III, May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M 1203; Treaty 
Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa art. 26, Nov. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1067. 
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qualified majority voting, supranational constitutional review can also be a 
means for the minority to challenge decisions of the majority.28 
In the above examples, supranational constitutional-review authority does 
not necessarily compromise national sovereignty, so long as the court is 
reviewing the validity of supranational rules. But, international courts have also 
assumed a sovereignty-compromising constitutional authority to review the 
compatibility of national and international rules. Legal scholars call the 
phenomenon the “constitutionalization” of an international treaty, by which 
they mean that the treaty is elevated to a sort of constitutional (supreme) status 
by the rulings of the court. The ECJ’s declaration of the supremacy of 
European law (mimicked by the ATJ) was one such constitutionalizing act 
because it gave the ECJ the de facto authority to render national rules that 
conflict with European laws inapplicable.29 Some see the creation of the WTO 
(World Trade Organization), and the WTO appellate body’s jurisprudence, as 
constitutionalizing the WTO Treaty because it makes incompatible national 
laws too costly to maintain (though others disagree because countries can 
accept retaliation instead of changing conflicting laws).30 Design changes 
undertaken and under discussion regarding the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) have, according to some scholars, increasingly turned the 
ECHR into a supranational constitutional court that reviews the compatibility 
of national laws and practices with European human-rights rules.31 
Constitutionalization of international treaties represents a case in which a 
court expands its initial authority and in doing so compromises national 
sovereignty. Whether constitutionalizing acts of ICs have the intended effect 
depends mostly on the reaction of the country whose policy is condemned. In 
many countries, governments are bound to international law, but there is no 
corresponding domestic rule or legislation to make international law, or IC 
rulings, binding within the national system. If governments choose to change 
“illegal” policies, or if IC decisions that rule national policies illegal have no  
 
 28. Germany, for example, challenged the EU’s Banana Protocol, which was passed despite its 
objections. Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Banana Splits: Nested and Competing Regimes in the 
Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362, 367 (2007). 
 29. Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2416–19 (1991). See also 
Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1981). The equivalent ATJ ruling is Andean Tribunal of Justice Interpretaciones Prejudiciales 1 IP 
87, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/canprocedimientosinternet/interpretacion_ 
prejudicial.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 30. Petersmann believes the AB’s jurisprudence has constitutionalized the WTO, while John 
Jackson and Jeffrey Dunoff disagree. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO’s 
‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647 (2006); JOHN H. 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998); Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System Through the 1994 Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161 (1995). 
 31. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: From International 
Tribunal to Constitutional Court, Presentation at the NYU Law School Colloquium on Compliance 
with International Human Rights (Jan. 29, 2007). 
02__ALTER.DOC 6/9/2008  8:01:32 AM 
Winter 2008]                  DELEGATING TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS 51 
national effect, in fact there may be no compromise of national sovereignty. If, 
however, national governments do not act but their courts accept an 
international decision as authoritative within the domestic realm, the 
international legal ruling can have a constitutional effect in the domestic system. 
F. The Fundamental Risk of Delegation to Courts 
This Part has defined four roles that courts play in the international political 
system. For some roles the authors of both the law and the delegation contract 
are binding others—using courts to help ensure that other actors (police, 
national administrations, private actors) follow the rules they created. Other-
binding delegation is based on efficiency logic—states are using the legal 
process to monitor compliance with the law, expending their coercive resources 
only when a legal ruling on its own is insufficient to induce compliance. Self-
binding delegation, on the other hand, is based on credibility-enhancement 
logic. Whenever publics might be suspicious of self-serving interpretations of 
the law by public actors, governments and legislatures can gain credibility by 
entrusting the interpretation of the rules to independent courts.32 But it is likely 
impossible to make a delegation wholly other-binding. In making courts the 
keeper of “the law,” governments create a rival body with the authority to say 
what the law means, and in exchange governments perhaps get some credibility 
as being committed to a rule of law. The key distinction is whether delegation to 
courts will be primarily other-binding in that it is mostly other actors—private 
actors, or state interlocutors—that will be subject to the decisions of courts. 
Table 1 below summarizes which delegations to courts tend to be primarily self-
binding or other-binding, examining the domestic context separately from the 
international context. The international column shows that delegation can be 
designed to be both other-binding and self-binding. It is an empirical question 
whether specific delegations to ICs in practice end up more self-binding or 
other-binding. 
If one compares the domestic and international columns of Table 1, it is 
clear that delegating the exact same tasks involves a greater sovereignty risk 
internationally than it does domestically. Here the limits of a domestic analogy 
are evident; diplomats making assumptions about ICs based on their knowledge 
of domestic courts may end up with unintended outcomes. But, regardless of 
whether a judicial role is primarily other-binding or mostly self-binding, 
delegation to courts involves a risk that judges will interpret the law differently 
than governments or legislative bodies might want, and a risk that judicial roles 
will morph over time. These risks are more problematic at the international 
level because international rules are very hard to rewrite, making legal rulings 
harder to reverse, and because any finding against a national law inevitably 
strikes at the heart of national sovereignty. Of course this is the whole point of 
 
 32. The differences in logic is explained further in Karen J. Alter, Agent or Trustee: International 
Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 33 (2008). 
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international judicial review—to make it more costly for a country to defend 
the legitimacy of policies labeled “illegal” by an authoritative international legal 
body. 
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The discussion above identified a number of ways in which authors of the 
delegation contract can influence the likelihood that sovereignty will be 
compromised, meaning that states will find themselves bound by judicial 
interpretation. States can create restrictions on who can bring cases, on the 
types of legal arguments that can be raised, and on whether and how sanctions 
are associated with a finding of a legal violation. Dispute adjudication can be 
noncompulsory, requiring both parties to consent before a case proceeds to 
court. Prosecutors can be tightly controlled to limit the extent of enforcement 
delegation. Although administrative delegation requires compulsory 
jurisdiction and private access, legislators can create broad or narrow standards 
of review and broad or narrow rules of standing to bring a case. Access can be 
limited in constitutional review, thereby limiting the number and types of cases 
that can be raised. Finally, public actors can be exempted from certain types of 
legal challenges (for example, sitting government officials can be exempt, or 
states can be exempt from cases involving national security). 
The differences in sovereignty costs domestically and internationally are 
captured graphically in Diagram 1, which also highlights some of the ways in 
which sovereignty costs are regulated. Note that the sovereignty costs are only 
“potential” costs—usage of the court combined with the willingness of judges to 
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assert their authority will determine the extent to which delegation actually 
becomes sovereignty-compromising. 
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This diagram contrasts to some extent with the diagram in this symposium’s 
introduction in which the function of the judicial roles—the monitoring of 
administrative and enforcement roles, and the adjudication of a dispute- 
adjudication role—are seen as relatively sovereignty-compromising compared 
to policy implementation or research and advice roles.33 The difference is that I 
do not see binding others as per se sovereignty-compromising—especially if the 
“others” being bound are international as opposed to domestic actors. 
III 
DELEGATION TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE EMPIRICAL RECORD34 
This Part assesses the empirical record in delegating the four roles to ICs. 
Table 2 below lists the existing ICs that meet PICT’s definition of an 
international court, organized by the year they were established.35 The table 
indicates whether the court has compulsory jurisdiction, whether private actors 
have access so as to initiate litigation, and the number of cases the court has 
litigated. Where courts existed before 1990, the table breaks out the judicial 
activity since then. The PICT definition is stringent, requiring that a court be 
permanent to count as an IC. This table would be longer if it included quasi-
judicial bodies or legal bodies that are not permanent (like NAFTA). Also 
 
 33. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 21, fig. 3. 
 34. This Part draws on material previously published in Alter, supra note 3. 
 35. See supra note 1 for PICT’s definition. The year the treaty was signed is the year the court was 
established. Often courts were not created until a threshold number of states ratified the court treaty, 
thus there is a gap between the date of establishment and the date of creation. 
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missing from the table are seven African courts,36 which mimic in design their 
European counterparts but which exist mostly on paper. If African courts were 
added in, along with legal bodies that are functionally equivalent to permanent 
courts, the trends discussed below would mainly be reinforced; there would be 
more delegation of administrative, enforcement, and constitutional roles to 
international legal bodies, and more often than not these international judicial 
bodies would have compulsory jurisdiction and allow private actors to initiate 
litigation. 
 



































































 36. Not included because of a lack of information are the Instance Judiciare of the Arab Maghreb 
Union, the Court of Justice of the East African Community, the Court of Justice of the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African 
Court of Justice, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, and the 
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community. For more on these courts, see the website 
for the African International Courts and Tribunals, http://www.aict-ctia.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 37. Courts that lack general compulsory jurisdiction usually have optional protocols which states 
can sign to commit to compulsory jurisdiction among signatory states. 
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14 judgments (2006). 
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judgments by the Appeals 
Chamber (2006). 
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1 The data was compiled by author, based on visiting the websites of the international courts 
and consulting scholarship as available. Bibliography available from the author. This table does 
not include labor cases involving disputes with employees of IOs or contempt of court 
decisions. Courts are constantly changing how they report usage; thus one can find 
discrepancies over time. 
*   = no cases 
** = data not available. Figures exclude staff cases. 
2 The GATT system changed significantly, going from a quasi-legal body to meeting PICT’s 
definition of an IC. 
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Table 2 shows a proliferation in the number of ICs and in international 
litigation since 1990. Although other issues, like security, can be litigated before 
the ICJ—a general-jurisdiction court—the delegation pattern reveals that states 
have greatest comfort in delegating to ICs the interpretation of trade 
commitments and human-rights issues, including war crimes. Table 2 also shows 
a change in the design of courts over time. European courts account for the 
majority of international legal outputs. Usually the usage rates by European 
courts are attributed in part to the design of European courts—European courts 
have compulsory jurisdiction, and private actors can initiate disputes.38 Table 2 
paints a picture of ICs increasingly resembling the European design model of 
compulsory jurisdiction and private access. Twelve ICs allow private parties to 
initiate legal suits against state actors. Six allow nonstate actors—international 
commissions or prosecutors—to initiate disputes against state actors. The last 
two columns of data support the notion that ICs with compulsory jurisdiction 
and nonstate-actor access hear more cases,39 but it also shows that not all ICs 
with compulsory jurisdiction and private-access ICs are equally active. 
In fact, much of the design trend can be explained by the roles delegated to 
ICs. Table 3 below summarizes my findings on roles delegated to ICs, and on 
the design of the ICs for the given role. These classifications are based on an 
analysis of the Court Treaties defining the jurisdiction and design of the IC. To 
categorize a court, I looked for the grant of jurisdiction identified in the first 
column. For example, to be classified as having administrative-review authority, 
a court needed explicit jurisdiction in cases regarding the “legality of any action, 
directive or decision” of a public administrative actor (which often included 
authority to hear appeals for nonaction). Note that most ICs have been 
delegated more than one role, with each role defined in separate treaty articles. 
The rules regarding compulsory jurisdiction and access can also vary by role. 
For example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has an 
interstate dispute-resolution role that lacks compulsory jurisdiction. ITLOS also 
has an administrative-review role with respect to the Seabed Authority for 
which it has compulsory jurisdiction, and access for private litigants.40  The 
results are as follows. 
 
 
 38. E.g., Alvarez, supra note 2, at 425–27; Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a 
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 288–91 (1997). 
 39. Robert Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 457, 474 (2000). 
 40. John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 
118–26, 133–35, 138 (1998). 
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Table 3: Delegation of Different Roles to ICs41 
 
Judicial Role ICs With This Role  
(See Table 2 for full court 
names.) 
Percent of Total ICs 
Explicitly Delegated 
This Role (n=20) 
Dispute Adjudication 
General jurisdiction to “interpret 
the meaning of the law” or to 
“ensure that the law is respected”  
ATJ*, BCJ, CACJ*, CCJ, 
COMESA, ECCIS, ECJ, 
EFTAC, ICJ, ITLOS, 





Jurisdiction regarding an 
enumerated list of crimes or 
jurisdiction to hear infringement 
suits against states. Cases 
generally are raised by a public- 
prosecutorial type actor. 
ATJ*, CACJ*, COMESA, 
ECHR*, ECJ, EFTAC, 






Jurisdiction in cases concerning 
the “legality of any action, 
regulation, directive, or decision” 
of a public actor, or the public 
actor’s “failure to act.” 
ATJ*, BCJ*, CACJ*, CFI*, 






Jurisdiction to review the validity 
of any legislative act, regulation, 
or directive of an IO. 
ATJ*, CACJ*, COMESA*, 
ECJ* 
CCJ*? 
Post 1998 ECHR*? 
4/20 
 
20% (possibly 30%) 
Courts in bold have compulsory jurisdiction associated with the role. 
Courts with a * have private access associated with the role. 
 
A. International Delegation of Dispute-Adjudication Authority 
At first glance, delegation of dispute-adjudication authority appears to be 
the most common form of delegation to ICs. But this appearance may mainly be 
a result of the “catch-all” nature of dispute adjudication—the fact that the other 
three roles need explicit definitions of jurisdiction or design elements to be 
classified in the role. Indeed, if one labeled as “decentralized enforcement 
mechanisms” all dispute-resolution mechanisms with compulsory jurisdiction, 
then enforcement would be the most prevalent role delegated to ICs (see the 
discussion of delegation of enforcement authority that follows). 
 
 41. Based on the author’s coding. Please contact the author for more information about this 
coding. 
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The ICJ is the oldest IC on Table 2, and from inception it has served as a 
default international dispute-adjudication body, meaning that many treaties 
designate the ICJ as the dispute-adjudication body rather than create a new 
body for the specific treaty. The ICJ lacks compulsory jurisdiction, but there is 
an optional protocol whereby states can commit to compulsory jurisdiction42 and 
countries can decide à la carte to make the ICJ’s jurisdiction compulsory for 
specific treaties.43 Thus, the ICJ’s lack of compulsory jurisdiction is not per se a 
reason not to rely on the ICJ. But the ICJ is a general-jurisdiction body, with 
judges who could come from anywhere in the world. Although litigants have the 
option of appointing ad hoc judges for a specific case, if an agreement involves 
substance that requires specific expertise and pertains to only a handful of 
countries, the ICJ’s general design may make it unattractive. Indeed, all of the 
other ICs with dispute-adjudication roles either cover more specific issues, 
include only a small group of states, or both, suggesting that these courts were 
created with the intent that they have a narrower, more-specialized jurisdiction 
than the ICJ. 
It appears that states are increasingly abandoning the ICJ model of 
noncompulsory dispute adjudication. The new ITLOS court and the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OAPEC) court lack 
compulsory jurisdiction, but every other dispute-adjudication body has been 
given compulsory jurisdiction. Why have states agreed to a more sovereignty-
compromising delegation of international dispute-adjudication authority? An 
analysis of which ICs have compulsory jurisdiction suggests an answer. States 
appear to make dispute adjudication compulsory primarily in economic 
agreements: seven of the ICs with compulsory authority are part of trade 
unions,44 and two others handle primarily corporate investment disputes.45 Of 
course, not all economic agreements have international dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, let alone mechanisms with compulsory jurisdiction. Analyzing 
trade agreements, James McCall Smith found that trade unions are more likely 
to be associated with compulsory dispute-adjudication compared to free-trade 
zones. McCall Smith reasons that the desire to capture the benefits of trade is 
driving decisions about the type of dispute-adjudication mechanism chosen.46 
Indeed, the concentration of dispute-resolution mechanisms with compulsory 
jurisdiction in economic agreements suggests that states especially want 
 
 42. Sixty-two states (out of 191 United Nations members) have agreed to the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction, though thirteen limit their assent to issues other than cases arising from belligerent action. 
 43. This is how the United States came to withdraw twice from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction—
first from the ICJ’s general compulsory jurisdiction, and second with respect to the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations. 
 44. The World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body, the Andean Community, the European 
Union, the European Free Trade Area, the East and South African Common Market, the Caribbean 
Community, and the Benelux Community. 
 45. The Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Court for the 
Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa. 
 46. James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design, 54 INT’L ORG. 137, 145–50 
(2000). 
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economic commitments to be enforceable. Having these agreements enforced 
through interstate dispute resolution, as opposed to private actors or an 
international-commission litigation, helps ensure that only cases the member 
parties really care about are litigated. When dispute-resolution agreements 
allow for suspending trade access as remedy (the Andean Community and 
WTO), reciprocity becomes the main force for compliance. 
Only three out of the thirteen ICs with dispute-resolution authority also 
allow private access for this role. These cases appear to be designed to allow 
relatively small disputes to be handled outside of diplomatic channels. The 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration for the Organization of the 
Harmonization of Corporate Law in Africa (OHADA) is mainly an appeals 
body for national rulings applying common corporate laws and regulations; 
allowing private actors to appeal national court rulings creates a nondiplomatic 
outlet to handle investor disputes.47 The ITLOS generally lacks compulsory 
jurisdiction, but it has compulsory jurisdiction for disputes involving the seizing 
of vessels48 and for contractual disputes between private actors and the Seabed 
Authority, perhaps so these issues do not become diplomatic controversies. The 
exception to both arguments above is the Central American Court of Justice 
(CACJ). It is a general-jurisdiction court pertaining to the countries of Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; its jurisdiction is 
compulsory; and private actors can raise cases.49 
Although dispute adjudication may be a prevalent role delegated to ICs, it is 
not per se the most-important or most-frequently activated international 
judicial role. It is hard to assess what percentage of each court’s docket actually 
involves dispute adjudication. The most active ICs with this role—the ECJ and 
ATJ—break down the type of legal case by how the case was referred, creating 
categories of preliminary rulings cases (cases referred by national courts), 
infringement suits raised by the Commission or Secretariat, nullification suits 
(administrative review of IO outputs), and direct actions (cases raised directly 
in front of the IC). There appear to be very few straight-up interstate dispute-
adjudication cases in the ECJ and ATJ. This is not really surprising. Dispute-
adjudication cases may reach the IC as infringement suits, with states asking the 
Commission or Secretariat to pursue the issue instead of bringing a case 
themselves. The other dispute-adjudication courts are rarely used—with the 
notable exception of the WTO.50 
 
 47. NAFTA has similar provisions for investor disputes. See, e.g., North American Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639. NAFTA is not on Table 1 because its 
legal bodies are not permanent. 
 48. The owner of the boat may bring the suit, but the plaintiff’s government must first consent for 
the case to go forward. Noyes, supra note 40, at 123. 
 49. For more information on the CACJ, see Project on International Courts and Tribunals, Central 
American Court of Justice, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/CACJ.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). 
 50. The lack of large dispute-adjudication case loads—with the notable exception of the WTO—
may reflect a bias in the data. If most international disputes are dealt with through alternative-dispute-
resolution bodies—via arbitration, diplomacy, or legalized dispute resolution undertaken by courts that 
are not permanent or that deal with private-actor disputes only—my reliance on PICT’s categorization 
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B. International Delegation of Enforcement Authority 
The enforcement role involves public prosecutors bringing criminal or 
infringement suits against states or their agents (government administrative 
actors or government officials). Fifty-five percent of ICs (eleven of twenty) have 
been delegated explicit enforcement roles. Delegation of enforcement roles are 
found in the three central areas of IC authority—international criminal law, 
trade law, and human-rights law. In Part II of this article, I argued that 
compulsory dispute adjudication can easily morph into a decentralized 
enforcement role, in which aggrieved states rather than central prosecutors 
bring suits to enforce the international agreement.51 If ICs with compulsory 
dispute-adjudication authority but no international prosecutor to help enforce 
the agreement (for example, the WTO,52 the Economic Court of the Common-
Wealth of Independent States (ECCIS),53 the Benelux Court of Justice (BCJ), 
and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)) were included, the number of ICs 
created with some enforcement role in mind would expand to seventy-five 
percent of all ICs. 
At the international level, delegation of enforcement authority can become 
self-binding in principle and thus bring sovereignty risks. But a deeper look at 
the record of delegation shows that eight of the eleven delegations were 
designed to minimize risk. For two ICs, delegation of enforcement authority 
was coupled with political-control mechanisms: Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IAHCR) countries can opt out of the court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction and pressure the Commission not to pursue a case; for the 
COMESA court, a council of states must sign off before an infringement suit 
can be brought. Three of the delegations of enforcement powers are other-
binding delegations to ad hoc criminal courts (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra 
Leone Tribunals). Another three delegations couple enforcement authority 
with fairly weak sanctioning systems so as to minimize the cost of a legal loss—
CACJ, COMESA, and European Free Trade Area Court (EFTAC) courts can 
find a violation but cannot authorize sanctions. 
The exceptions to these statements include the ECJ, the ECHR, the ATJ, 
and the ICC. In each of these cases, submission to IC authority gradually 
developed over time through a series of sequential changes that each involved 
greater sovereignty costs. The ECJ’s enforcement mechanism was originally 
 
may actually hide where the action occurs. This bias may exist, but the data nonetheless suggests that 
most international adjudication by ICs does not involve interstate dispute adjudication. 
 51. See text accompanying note 13. 
 52. See discussion supra note 15. 
 53. The ECCIS enforcement role is specific; Article 32 of the Charter of CIS allows the Economic 
Court to help “ensure the observation of economic obligations.” Commonwealth of Independent States 
Charter art. 32, June 22, 1993, 34 I.L.M. 1279. This has been interpreted by the ECCIS court as an 
enforcement role that pertains to any rule that gives rise to “tangible benefits” for a party. For more 
information on the ECCIS court, see Worldcourts.com, Economic Court of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States Jurisdiction, http://www.worldcourts.com/eccis/eng/jurisdiction.htm (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2008). 
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combined with a “toothless” sanctioning system.54 When national courts started 
enforcing ECJ rulings, Europe found itself to have, de facto, an uneven 
enforcement mechanism—countries with more-robust national judiciaries were 
held accountable to European law and were more likely to follow ECJ 
decisions, compared to countries with weaker national judiciaries. In 1998, 
European states added a European-level sanctioning mechanism to address this 
imbalance. Although any European state can be fined for noncompliance, the 
change was made mainly to confront the chronic noncompliers.55 To date there 
have been very few fines levied, and there is little to suggest that this change has 
significantly affected compliance levels with ECJ rulings—mainly because 
national courts tend to enforce ECJ rulings directly.56 
The ECHR has never had large sanctioning capabilities—its rulings 
primarily carry social stigmas.57 The ECHR was originally designed to be 
politically controllable; the ECHR’s commission was set up both to investigate 
charges of human-rights abuses, and as a gatekeeper to ensure that frivolous 
cases did not reach the court. Although at first reticent to refer matters to the 
court,58 over time the commission became willing to refer more cases. By 1998, 
the commission was no longer gatekeeping—it referred nearly every plausible 
case to the ECHR. At that point, the commission mainly created an extra step 
in the process. Thus, states decided to abolish the commission as a first step to 
reaching the ECHR. Eventually membership in the Council of Europe, and 
submission to the ECHR’s authority, became a signal that a government is 
committed to following a liberal democratic path (and thereby is a candidate for 
accession to the EU).59 Thus, European states now willingly submit to the 
ECHR’s authority so that they can obtain the benefit of being part of the 
European liberal democratic club. 
The ATJ was created in 1984;60 it took until 1996 for the Junta to be 
authorized by member states to bring an infringement suit against a state. In 
1996, the Andean Pact adopted a number of changes to make the institution 
more accessible, including allowing private actors to raise infringement suits 
 
 54. Federico Mancini & David Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. 
REV. 175, 183 (1994). 
 55. JONAS TALLBERG, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE AND SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: 
MAKING STATES COMPLY 76–84 (2003). 
 56. See Tanja Börzel, Non-Compliance in the European Union: Pathology or Statistical Artifact, 8 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 803 (1994). 
 57. ECHR can award compensation, but not punitive damages, to victims. Thus the fine is rarely 
sufficient to serve as a deterrent. On ECHR fines, see DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 147–60 (1999). 
 58. The ECHR’s early case load was as follows: from 1959 through 1969, 10 decisions; from 1970 
through 1979, 26 decisions; from 1980 through 1984, 58 decisions; from 1985 through 1989, 111 
decisions. Data from A.H. ROBERTSON & J. G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 310 (1994). 
 59. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (1994). 
 60. E. Barlow Keener, The Andean Common Market Court of Justice: Its Purpose, Structure, and 
Future, 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 39, 50 (1987). 
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directly with the ATJ should the General Secretariat refuse to raise a suit.61 This 
change made it harder for states to keep the General Secretariat from pursuing 
infringements, and it meant that the ATJ’s sanctioning system was finally 
usable. As of June 2007, the ATJ has found sixty-one formal infringements of 
Andean rules, leading to thirty authorizations of retaliation.62 
In contrast to the evolutionary development of Europe’s courts and the 
ECJ, the ICC began as a true departure for international criminal justice. 
Historically, international criminal justice was victor’s justice—other-binding 
delegation wherein the losers of the war were held accountable for their 
violations despite the victors having committed similar crimes.63 Ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals were other-binding delegations in the sense that 
the actors supporting legal redress knew that they would not themselves be 
subject to international criminal-justice efforts. The ad hoc courts were 
nonetheless path-breaking delegations because they introduced a new model, 
one in which all sides were held accountable for their crimes.64 Once the “all 
sides equally accountable” model was adopted, it was not clear why certain 
atrocities could have legal remedies (for example, crimes committed during the 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone crises), while other crimes escaped 
punishment. The ICC is meant to generalize the “all sides accountable model,” 
and it has been met with stiff resistance by some because the ICC self-binds 
states. 
One could look at the gradual strengthening of certain international 
enforcement mechanisms and argue that there is a trend towards creating and 
using international enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, the enforcement roles of 
the GATT system, the Andean Community, the European Union, and the 
European Human Rights system were all beefed up over time to increase the 
opportunity and capacity of these ICs to hold states accountable to their legal 
obligations.65 And, in the 1990s many states took the biggest plunge of all by 
committing to the ICC’s general jurisdiction over all war crimes. 
 
 61. These changes were adopted by the Protocol Amending the Treaty Creating the Court of 
Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, concluded on May 28, 1996, available at 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/tratprot/cochabamba.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) 
[hereinafter Cochabamba Protocol] (amending the Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the 
Cartagena Agreement, concluded on May 28, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979) [hereinafter ATJ Treaty]). 
 62. These represent the cases not settled out of court; there have been 201 reasoned opinions 
during the same time period (not all of which find infringements). Retaliatory sanctions in the Andean 
context are similar to the WTO—a state is allowed to suspend concessions against another state up to 
the authorized amount. Thus, noncompliance can be sanctioned only when states are interested in 
retaliating. See SECRETARY GENERAL, ANDEAN COMMUNITY, INFORME DE LA SECRETARIA 
GENERAL DE LA COMUNIDAD ANDINA 2006–2007 (June 14, 2007) (on file with author). 
 63. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 8–16 (2000). 
 64. The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is perhaps the clearest case of this model, 
though the principle that all sides are accountable certainly holds for the ICTY’s Rwandan and Sierra 
Leone counterparts. 
 65. GATT’s dispute-adjudication authority started as noncompulsory. After the U.S. started 
unilaterally “enforcing” GATT rules, GATT states decided a more usable enforcement mechanism 
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But if commitment to international legal enforcement is a sign of linear 
progress, one must note how lumpy and unequal the commitment often is. 
Enforcement mechanisms are the strongest for the issues the West cares most 
about—trade and mass human-rights atrocities. Outside of Europe, delegation 
of enforcement authority tends to bind the weak more than it binds the 
powerful. For example, the WTO’s and ATJ’s sanctioning system of allowing 
winning states to retaliate against states maintaining illegal trade barriers allows 
the rich to essentially buy their way out of compliance by accepting retaliation 
rather than complying.66 The ICC allows states to escape its authority by 
prosecuting their own violators—which Western states are likely to do. 
Although powerful actors have escape mechanisms to deal with IC 
enforcement authority, it is noteworthy that wherever countries have pre-
committed to an IC’s enforcement authority (explicitly or as general 
compulsory dispute adjudication), powerful and weak states have willingly 
participated in legal suits that are brought. This fact stands in contrast to the 
ICJ, in whose proceedings some countries have refused to participate (in cases 
for which the ICJ’s jurisdiction was compulsory), forcing the ICJ to continue the 
case with no defendant present. 
C. International Delegation of Administrative Review Authority 
Forty percent of ICs (eight of twenty) have been delegated explicit 
administrative-review authority as indicated by the IC’s authority to review the 
legality of any action, regulation, directive, or decision of a public actor, and its 
authority to question failures to act. The OHADA court is categorized as a 
dispute-resolution body since it does not have the explicit authority to hear 
challenges regarding the legality of a public decision, but it will primarily hear 
appeals of national-court rulings when the case involves a challenge to a public 
decision regarding a private firm.67 If this court is added into the calculations, 
forty-five percent of ICs play an administrative-review role. 
Most of the ICs with administrative-review authority are embedded in 
economic agreements (the exception to this rule is the ITLOS Seabed 
authority). All eight agreements with explicit delegation of administrative-
review authority also create supranational administrators with the power to 
issue binding decisions. Thus, the delegation of administrative-review authority 
appears to be a direct attempt to extend to the international level the sort of 
legal protections found within domestic administrative states, and it appears to 
 
would be preferable. When the WTO was created in 1994, its dispute-resolution mechanism was made 
compulsory. On the WTO system, see BARTON ET AL., supra note 15, at 70–73.  
 66. Karen J. Alter, Resolving or Exacerbating Disputes? The WTO’s New Dispute Resolution 
System, 79 INT’L AFF. 783, 786 (2003). See also Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in 
the WTO: Rules Are Rules—Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335 (2000). 
 67. Note that an IC can end up engaged in administrative review in other ways. Dispute-resolution 
cases, for example, can end up asking essentially administrative-review questions. ICs can exercise this 
review, but their rulings will not per se nullify the questionable administrative decision, nor will they be 
reviewing “failures to act.” 
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be primarily other-binding delegation (true for the ATJ, the BCJ, the CACJ, 
the Court of First Instance (CFI), COMESA, the ECJ, the EFTAC, and the 
ITLOS contexts). Sometimes, however, there is a self-binding dimension to this 
delegation too—found for the ECCIS, the OHADA, the ATJ, and the ECJ. In 
these cases, domestic actors end up applying international agreements, which 
has led to a concern that rules will be unevenly applied. This concern has led in 
turn to a decision to submit national administration of the specific international 
agreements to international supervision. 
Administrative review requires compulsory jurisdiction and private access, 
so as to allow those affected by administrative rulings to challenge them. All of 
the ICs with administrative-review authority (both the eight ICs with explicit 
administrative delegations, and the two with implicit administrative-review 
delegations) have compulsory jurisdiction and private access for this role. Thus, 
administrative-review powers can account for ten of the twelve ICs that have 
private access and compulsory jurisdiction. 
All ICs on this list play roles other than administrative review—be it dispute 
resolution, constitutional review, or enforcement roles. But it is noteworthy that 
the fewest caveats are placed on ICs in an administrative-review role as 
compared to other roles. One sees a lack of caveats in terms of access rules—
administrative review and labor-dispute roles68 tend to be among the few places 
in which private actors are allowed direct access to the IC.69 One also sees a lack 
of caveats in that legal standing is rarely denied (in contrast to constitutional 
review for the ATJ and ECJ in which private actors must show that the law in 
question directly affects them).70 
The busiest courts—the ATJ, the ECJ, and the CFI—find themselves most 
occupied with respect to administrative-review cases—be they reviews of 
supranational administrative rulings, or reviews of national efforts to implement 
supranational regulations. This means that numerically speaking, 
administrative-review cases account for the lion’s share of all international 
litigation (all CFI cases, all ECJ direct-action cases, most ECJ preliminary-
 
 68. A number of ICs have authority to adjudicate disputes between IOs and their employees. 
 69. The exception to this is the ITLOS body. Access is wide to the Seabed authority in this role, 
but the types of challenges are circumscribed: 
Without prejudice to article 191, in exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to article 187, the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber shall not pronounce itself on the question of whether any rules, 
regulations and procedures of the Authority are in conformity with this Convention, nor 
declare invalid any such rules, regulations and procedures. Its jurisdiction in this regard shall 
be confined to deciding claims that the application of any rules, regulations and procedures of 
the Authority in individual cases would be in conflict with the contractual obligations of the 
parties to the dispute or their obligations under this Convention, claims concerning excess of 
jurisdiction or misuse of power, and to claims for damages to be paid or other remedy to be 
given to the party concerned for the failure of the other party to comply with its contractual 
obligations or its obligations under this Convention. 
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 189, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 477. 
 70. There is no need to require heavy-handed remedies—administrative-review rulings primarily 
remand an action to the administrative actor, nullifying the existing decision and requiring them to 
issue a new one. 
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ruling cases, all ATJ preliminary-ruling and nullification cases, all OHADA 
cases, and all BENELUX cases)71—thus roughly 20,032 of the existing 33,057 
cases brought to all ICs). If one adds in the reality that seventy-two percent of 
ECHR rulings involve “access to justice” claims—charges that the national 
administration of justice is either too slow or insufficiently respectful of 
plaintiff’s due-process rights72—it becomes clear that numerically speaking, most 
international litigation involves reviewing the actions of public implementers of 
rules and policies. Although international review of national administrative 
actions can compromise national autonomy, administrative review is mostly 
other-binding and thus not deeply sovereignty-compromising. In any event, 
when review is limited to the actions of IOs, no national sovereignty is 
compromised. 
D. International Delegation of Constitutional Review Authority 
This analysis considers only explicit delegations of authority to ICs, thus not 
the actions of ICs to expand or constitutionalize their authority. Four ICs 
(twenty percent of all ICs) have been granted explicit authority to review the 
legality of legislative acts. In all of the cases, the subject of review is designed to 
be IO outputs—and thus the delegation is primarily other-binding. This review 
role fits with Bradley and Kelley’s delegation of “oversight authority”—
providing states a means to oversee the actions of an international 
organization.73 The ICs with explicit constitutional-review authority are 
primarily common-market bodies—the ATJ, COMESA, and the ECJ. (The 
CACJ also has constitutional-review authority.) All of these institutions have 
supranational political bodies that can exercise delegated legislative authority in 
that they can promulgate rules that are legally binding within domestic systems. 
International constitutional-review authority subjects this rulemaking power to 
constitutional review—which in most cases will involve reviewing the legality of 
actions of supranational legislative bodies. The circumscribed nature of this 
constitutional-review delegation perhaps explains why there are relatively few 
caveats limiting access to, or IC authority in, this role—all ICs with this 
delegated role have compulsory jurisdiction and private access. 
The two other potential ICs in this category include the CCJ—whose role 
will be determined when the supranational Secretariat’s and Council’s powers 
are determined—and the ECHR, which some observers see as so completely 
changed from its initial enforcement design as to now fit in this category. 
 
 71. Andean Tribunal cases seem to be mostly about intellectual property—well over ninety percent 
of the cases. Laurence Helfer, Karen Alter, and Maria Flo Guerzovich have a project underway 
examining this activity. Laurence Helfer, Karen J. Alter & Maria Flo Guerzovich, Constructing an 
Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 72. Rachel Cichowski, Courts, Rights and Democratic Participation, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 50, 65 
(2006). 
 73. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 22. 
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In sum, Table 2 presents a stark paper trend of creating ICs with both 
private access and compulsory jurisdiction. Deeper investigation of this trend 
reveals that wide access is mostly for other-binding roles—administrative 
review and constitutional review of IO outputs. Diagram 2 below maps actual 
delegations of IC authority onto the categories in Diagram 1 to capture which 
actual delegations are sovereignty-compromising. Remember that ICs can be 
delegated more than one role. The most extensive delegations of authority—in 
terms of the different roles ICs are given, and the sovereignty-compromising 
nature of the design of ICs—appear in economic agreements. It is interesting to 
note that the most active ICs are those where the sovereignty costs of 
delegation are highest. So one cannot conclude that sovereignty-compromising 
delegation is merely symbolic. It is also true, however, that not all rulings 
emerging from active courts compromise sovereignty, which may be why the 
sovereignty costs are more politically palatable. 
 
Diagram 2: Sovereignty Costs Associated With Delegation to ICs 
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There is strong evidence that states have tried to limit the sovereignty-
compromising nature of delegation to ICs. But the fundamental risk of 
delegation to ICs remains. The original delegations of authority to the ECJ and 
ECHR were not so sovereignty-compromising. But the ECHR and the ECJ 
have ended up exercising their powers in ways that are deeply compromising of 
national sovereignty.74 It was not so much the original grant of authority that 
created this outcome, but rather the bold assertiveness of the ICs as they 
 
 74. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 182–208 (2001); TALLBERG, supra note 55, at 92–127. See 
also Helfer, supra note 31. 
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exercised their authority. Indeed, the ATJ has the same structure as the ECJ—
with the same delegated roles and even wider private access to trigger 
litigation—yet it has not exercised its authority in as sovereignty-compromising 
a way.75 Meanwhile, the WTO’s appellate body was granted only a dispute-
adjudication role, and it lacks private access, but it has ended up ruling in ways 
that do compromise national sovereignty whereas similarly designed bodies 
(ECCIS, EFTAC, BCJ, CACJ, and COMESA) have not.76 All of this suggests 
that the substance of the legal suits—itself an artifact of the court’s role—
matters more in determining the extent to which sovereignty is compromised 
than does the fact of delegation or the design of the IC. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: THE SOVEREIGNTY  
COSTS OF DELEGATION TO INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
This article has aimed to correct the impression of what delegation to ICs is 
about. Many scholars and practitioners assume that ICs primarily play an 
interstate dispute-adjudication role, along the lines of the ICJ.77 Eric Posner and 
John Yoo go so far as to suggest that given the heterogeneity of state 
preferences, noncompulsory dispute adjudication is the only role ICs can play 
effectively.78 Although dispute adjudication is a prevalent role delegated to ICs, 
it is not the only role, and dispute adjudication is increasingly combined with 
compulsory jurisdiction, making ICs more about enforcement—precisely what 
Posner and Yoo dislike.79 In terms of IC dockets, interstate dispute adjudication 
clearly is not the most prevalent role ICs play. 
This analysis raises theoretical challenges for existing theories of IC 
independence as it relates to compromise of national sovereignty. In Principal–
Agent (P-A) literature, ICs are presumed to be agents of the states that create 
them, and independence is assessed in terms of the rules that shape the 
principal’s ability to change the delegation contract.80 Principal–Agent theory 
expects that the harder it is to sanction an agent through recontracting, the 
 
 75. Karen J. Alter, Exporting the European Court of Justice Model: The Experience of the 
Andean Common Market Court of Justice (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 76. CLAUDE BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY 37–69 (2001). See also Alter, 
supra note 66. 
 77. See Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International 
Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive 
Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045 (2005).  
 78. Posner &Yoo, supra note 4. 
 79. See id. at 66. 
 80. See Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC’s 
Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 
1993); Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification - the Agency Problem, CHI. J. INT’L L. 
333 (2002). 
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more independent the agent, and the greater the agent slippage.81 The problem 
with this theory, as applied to ICs, is immediately apparent. The rules for 
sanctioning ICs through recontracting are largely uniform: international judges 
are appointed for short terms (four to eight years); changing international rules, 
the original delegation contract to punish judges, or a combination of both 
tends to be hard (requiring unanimity or super-majorities); and cutting budgets 
slows the administration of justice but does not affect judicial autonomy. Given 
the vast similarity of the sanctioning mechanisms for ICs, it is clear that 
recontracting rules cannot explain variation in the extent of charges of IC 
slippage. 82 The failure of P-A theory to explain the variation in IC slippage 
highlights a problem with the assumptions of P-A theory; it is not true that the 
more independent ICs, the more likely judges are to deviate from the wishes of 
the principal. Rather, judicial roles significantly define how judges approach 
their interpretive task. In some IC roles, courts are not really agents of the 
states but are mechanisms states use to oversee the behavior of others (IOs, or 
signatories to the agreement). In other roles, ICs are designed to challenge 
illegal state practices. ICs would lose their legitimacy as legal actors if they shied 
from their given role because of political pressure. If IC judges must choose 
between adopting a transparently political decision or accepting a political 
sanction, ICs may actually find the political sanction to be the more appealing 
option. 
Legal literature does not focus on state ability to “sanction” judges through 
recontracting, but shares the assumption that independence is associated with 
slippage. Posner, Yoo, and to some extent Bradley and Kelley expect IC 
independence and thus the sovereignty costs of delegation to ICs to be shaped 
by whether international courts have compulsory jurisdiction and whether 
private actors are allowed to initiate disputes.83 Posner and Yoo expect 
compliance with IC rulings to be less likely when a state is an unwilling litigant, 
and thus they expect ICs with compulsory jurisdiction to be less effective 
overall in inducing compliance with the law. 84 Table 2 shows a trend of creating 
ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and private access, and thus highly 
independent ICs. There is more controversy surrounding ICs today than in the 
past, but given that there are more ICs, and given the seventy-five percent rise 
in IC activity, the increase in controversial rulings is not surprising. It is hard to 
say that the design trend itself has led to an increase in ICs being charged with 
“running amok.” Indeed, a number of ICs with compulsory jurisdiction and 
 
 81. Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and 
Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 27–31 
(Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006). 
 82. See Karen J. Alter, Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-Contracting Political 
Power, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren G. Hawkins 
et al. eds., 2006). 
 83. See  Posner & Yoo, supra note 4, at 25; Bradley & Kelley, supra note 6, at 30.  
 84. Posner & Yoo’s argument, supra note 4, has been ably critiqued. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra 
note 38. 
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private access do not seem to generate controversy (for example, the ATJ, 
COMESA, the CACJ, and OHADA)—and not simply because these systems 
are not used. Meanwhile, ICs without these design features do seem to 
engender controversy—such as the ICJ, which lacks compulsory jurisdiction 
and private access, and the WTO and ICC, which lack private access. The 
reason is the same as above—certain roles are inherently other-binding (and 
thus not sovereignty-compromising) and in certain roles judges are more likely 
to be deferential to legislative intent, thereby avoiding compromising 
sovereignty or engendering controversy. 
Nor does the extent to which sovereignty is compromised correspond 
entirely with the legal effect or sanctioning power of a court. All ICs considered 
in this analysis can issue binding rulings.85 There are variations in enforcement 
mechanisms for IC rulings, but these variations do not seem to account either 
for variation in sovereignty risks or in respect for IC rulings. For two reasons, 
sanctioning power is not key: First, in all cases, courts rely primarily on 
voluntary compliance by the parties—indeed Martin Shapiro argues that all 
courts, from weak to strong, seek the consent of their parties, crafting rulings 
that offer each side the chance to claim partial victory.86 Indeed, most actors 
follow IC rulings simply because the IC is the authoritative body charged with 
interpreting the law. Second, the stronger the enforcement mechanism, the less 
likely it is to actually be used. For example, ICJ rulings can be backed up by the 
use of force, but the United Nations Security Council has never authorized such 
a backup because doing so would be a drastic step of great political significance. 
Indeed, international legal systems with sanctioning mechanisms—like the 
systems of the WTO and ECJ—rarely invoke the sanctioning mechanisms, nor 
is it clear that the mere possibility of appealing to sanctions systematically 
increases compliance with legal rulings.87 These reasons are why international 
lawyers like Louis Henkin, Abraham Chayes, Harold Koh, and Thomas Franck 
emphasize the legitimacy of legal rulings over the strong, direct sanctions such 
as the use of force or criminal punishment.88 Chayes goes so far as stating that 
efforts to improve compliance by adding sanctions are a “waste of time.”89 
 
 85. The ability to issue binding rulings is inherent to PICT’s definition of an IC. Supra note 1. 
 86. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS 8–17 (1981). 
 87. Eric Reinhardt and Marc Busch have found that states are most likely to make concessions 
before a WTO ruling is issued, so that it is in fact the hardest cases—those where compliance is least 
likely—that end up in court. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158, 158–59 (2000–2001). There are 
certainly examples in which countries continued noncompliance up until the day that retaliatory 
sanctions would kick in, but in systems where enforcement mechanisms were added (such as the ECJ), 
there is little evidence that general compliance improved once sanctions for noncompliance became 
possible. See TALLBERG, supra note 55, at 57–68, 135–38; Börzel, supra note 56. 
 88. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 193 (1990); LOUIS 
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 9–10, 45–46 (1968); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER 
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); Harold Hong Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). 
 89. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 88. 
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Rather than focus on contract design, this article examined the roles 
delegated to courts showing how contract design largely follows from the 
judicial roles delegated to courts. International Courts with explicit 
enforcement and constitutional roles require compulsory jurisdiction for these 
roles. International Courts with explicit administrative roles also require private 
access. Indeed, ICs granted constitutional, administrative, and enforcement 
roles were also granted compulsory jurisdiction (with the exception of the 
IACHR), and, in the case of administrative and constitutional roles, they were 
granted private access. Because the administrative and constitutional roles are 
primarily other-binding, little national sovereignty is being compromised 
through delegation—which is why compulsory jurisdiction and private access do 
not per se translate into a compromise of national sovereignty. 
The assumptions about IC independence create misperceptions, which are 
then fed by a bias in American scholarship on ICs. Most scholars follow the 
political controversy—writing about rulings because the decision upset 
expectations or the desire of powerful actors, especially the United States or 
European states. The assumption is that controversial rulings are the most 
significant and sovereignty-compromising IC rulings. But really, the preferences 
of state actors, rather than the legal or policy significance of a ruling or the 
extent to which sovereignty is compromised, determine whether an IC ruling is 
controversial. American politicians have reacted strongly to WTO rulings even 
when the WTO rulings represented reasonable interpretations of the law, and 
the cost of the ruling was fairly insignificant in dollar and political terms. 
Meanwhile, when the ECJ extended the reach of European gender-equality 
provisions, ruling that the German constitutional ban on women in combat 
support roles violates European law, there was relatively little political 
controversy. The ECJ’s ruling was deeply sovereignty compromising—requiring 
Germany to change its constitution and fundamentally change the German 
military—an institution extremely close to the heart of national sovereignty.90 
But, neither the ECJ ruling nor the constitutional change was controversial 
because many Germans supported increasing the role of women in the 
military.91 
If, instead of following controversy, scholars followed the litigants, they 
would be writing more about ICs’ involvement in private–public dispute 
adjudication, enforcement, and administrative review, and about how most of 
these rulings are exactly what states hoped for when they delegated authority to 
ICs. If scholars focused more on IC jurisprudence in its various judicial roles 
and on the political impact of the jurisprudence, we would have a greater sense 
of when and how ICs facilitate state compliance with international rules—which 
really is the only way to ascertain how effective an international legal system 
actually is. We may also find that whether or not a ruling is sovereignty- 
 
 90. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 12 (F.R.G.) (as amended through Dec. 12, 2000). 
 91. Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2000 E.C.R. I-69; Gerhard 
Kuemmel, Changing State Institutions: The German Military and the Integration of Women 7 (2003). 
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compromising is epiphenomenal—that IC rulings that do not compromise 
sovereignty nonetheless generate controversy whereas highly sovereignty-
compromising IC rulings elicit compliance without complaints. 
Finally, this analysis reveals the limits of focusing on design features to 
explain IC behavior. This study can tell us what roles were explicitly delegated 
to ICs, but not what roles ICs come to play. It can tell us which roles, and thus 
which courts, are more likely to end up compromising national sovereignty, but 
not which ICs actually do end up compromising national sovereignty. In the 
end, the cases that are raised, and the audacity of judges in exercising their 
authority (or extending their authority) will ultimately determine when and to 
what extent national sovereignty becomes compromised by delegation to ICs. 
Fearing that sovereignty will be compromised, conservative commentators 
condemn nearly all delegations to international courts. This analysis reveals the 
extent to which fearful critics like Robert Bork, Claude Barfield, and Jeremy 
Rabkin are offering as examples just a small sliver of what ICs actually do.92 The 
point is not to eliminate self-binding delegation while retaining all other-
binding forms of delegation—indeed, eliminating all risk would be impossible. 
Before we discard the baby with the bathwater, we would be better off 
considering the benefits and costs of delegation to ICs as a package deal. 
Delegation to ICs provides many benefits—far more than ICs as “simple 
problem solving devices” that can provide information that helps states resolve 
disagreements.93 In the vast majority of cases, ICs are providing benefits by 
doing exactly what member states asked them to do—reviewing administrative 
decisionmaking, ensuring international institutions do not exceed their power, 
and enforcing international agreements so that states can capture the benefits of 
the treaties. In a small minority of cases, national sovereignty is compromised—
often by design, but also in surprising ways. People will come out differently in 
weighing this balance. For some, simply the idea that an international actor can 
tell a national actor what to do is intolerable. But, it is worth pointing out the 
direction of the trend. The empirical record shows an increasing willingness to 
create and use ICs, suggesting that most states are quite comfortable with the 
balance of costs to benefits as it stands. 
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